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Abstract Biotechnology has empirically established that
it is easier to construct and evaluate variant genes and
proteins than to account for the emergence and function of
wild-type macromolecules. Systematizing this constructive
approach, synthetic biology now promises to infer and
assemble entirely novel genomes, cells and ecosystems. It
is argued here that the theoretical and computational tools
needed for this endeavor are missing altogether. However,
such tools may not be required for diversifying organisms
at the basic level of their chemical constitution by adding,
substituting or removing elements and molecular compo-
nents through directed evolution under selection. Most
importantly, chemical diversiﬁcation of life forms could be
designed to block metabolic cross-feed and genetic cross-
talk between synthetic and wild species and hence protect
natural habitats and human health through novel types of
containment.
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A Renaissance for biology
It has become customary to begin position papers on nano-
technology and synthetic biology with a visionary quote
from Richard Feynman. For an essay on the guidance of
genetic demiurges, no introduction seems more appropriate
than the oracle he once delivered at a teachers convention
(Feynman 1968): ‘‘Science is the belief in the ignorance of
experts.’’
History is replete with tragic and comic confrontations
between experts fanatically attempting to enclose knowl-
edge within a deﬁnitive representation of the world
and discoverers stubbornly attempting to open, enlarge and
disrupt it. This confrontational need to oppose dogmas and
consecrated knowledge in order to achieve momentous
discoveries did not always originate from improved
hypotheses about the natural world. Certain major ﬁndings
were not only made in spite of a misconception, sometimes
they happened precisely because of it. Columbus would not
have discovered the New World if he had not wrongly
convinced himself that the actual size of the earth was
smaller than had been rightly conjectured by Eratosthenes
nearly 1,700 years earlier, and therefore that he could reach
Japan from Spain after sailing only a few days beyond the
western horizon (Boorstin 1985).
The knowledge that has been charted about the biolog-
ical world encompasses metabolism, the genetic code and
developmental regulation on one hand and ecological
inventories, phylogeny and population genetics on the
other. It does not cover the biotechnological innovations
that industrial progress in agriculture, medicine, chemistry
or energetics is calling for, as these innovations usually do
not correspond to adaptive solutions that natural organisms
have had to evolve. The art of navigation requires a
knowledge of cartography, yet cannot be reduced to it, just
as astronautics is distinct from astronomy. Likewise, the
account of the living world afforded by molecular and
evolutionary biology will be useful for exploring unnatural
history but will not be sufﬁcient for rationally designing
life forms that did not occur or even could never have
occurred during evolution.
P. Marliere (&)
Isthmus SARL, 75 rue de la Mare, 75020 Paris, France
e-mail: phmarliere@gmail.com
123
Syst Synth Biol (2009) 3:77–84
DOI 10.1007/s11693-009-9040-9In a spirit akin to the Renaissance, biology is undergoing
a metaphysical drama in which naturalists play the role of
obscurantist experts and synthetic biologists that of heu-
ristic conquistadores unhindered by their lack of navigation
instruments in their haste to reach uncharted continents of
life. The advent of a whole new biological world, which
genetically modiﬁed organisms have only begun to incar-
nate, warrants the search for reliable methodologies to
design and deploy artiﬁcial biodiversity while preserving
the old natural world.
Challenging expert beliefs
To alleviate the fears that the public in numerous coun-
tries has expressed about genetically modiﬁed organisms
(Torgersen 2004), the international community of experts
in biology and biotechnology has adopted a non-trans-
gressive stance about the operational scope and goals of
genetic engineering. This stance reads essentially as two
related beliefs: (i) the artiﬁcial biological objects created
by human tinkering have remained within the close
vicinity of the structures and functions at work in the
natural living world; (ii) the immense innovative resource
of genetic mutations, recombinations and interchanges in
the wild vastly outnumbers, outsmarts and encompasses
all our experimental attempts at reprogramming life. Both
these beliefs should be amended, for the sake of science
itself and also for the sake of preservation of the envi-
ronment and human health.
The ﬁrst expert belief (biological engineering explores
only the neighborhood of natural biodiversity) is chal-
lenged by the demonstrated feasibility of generating viable
descendants of common species whose chemical constitu-
tion deviates from those of all known extant species. Early
experiments along this line were performed in the 50s and
60s, before the dogmas of molecular biology were carved
in stone. They consisted of acclimatizing common cells to
alien molecular components. Selenomethionine and triﬂu-
oroleucine were indeed shown to fully substitute for the
universal amino acids methionine and leucine, respec-
tively, in the proteins of Escherichia coli strains having lost
the capability to make the corresponding natural amino
acid (Cohen and Cowie 1957; Rennert and Anker 1963).
Since apparently no mutation was required for enabling the
usage of a synthetic ersatz, it is proper not to describe such
changes as adaptations but as acclimatizations.
Even earlier, an alien analog of the vitamin biotin,
oxabiotin, was shown to viably supplement certain bacte-
rial strains lacking the ability to synthesize biotin (Pilgrim
et al. 1945). Although such experiments did not correspond
to genetic engineering, they demonstrated unequivocally
that synthetic compounds absent from natural species could
nevertheless be used by living cells as indispensible
nutrients. Strains fully substituted with alien components
grew poorly and reverted happily to the usage of the
canonical components, amino acids or vitamins. Now, what
would happen if such substitution experiments, which were
seldom followed up in later years (Wong 1983) and still
beg for a systematic investigation (Bacher and Ellington
2001), were conducted for an indeﬁnite duration in genetic
isolation from extant species? Would any expert take the
risk of asserting that no unprecedented form of life would
emerge from populations grown by substituting compo-
nents of living cells with alien ersatz, all the more if several
such substitutions were combined?
The second expert belief (molecular innovations of
artiﬁcially engineered organisms are within evolutionary
reach of natural biodiversity) is commonly evoked to
minimize the hazards of GMO constructs as compared to
‘‘natural genetic engineering’’ (Shapiro 2005). The faith in
the omnipotence of ‘‘natural genetic engineering’’ also
exudes from almost every expert report on the seemingly
inexhaustible emergence and inexorable dissemination of
antibiotic resistance. All such beliefs are challenged by
microbial demographics as inferred from ecology and
geochemistry. Of the order of 10
31 microbial genomes are
presently at work at the earth’s surface (Whitman et al.
1998), embodying most of the molecular know-how, met-
abolic and informational, that spontaneously originated,
accumulated and integrated during evolution. Assuming
boldly that each microbial cell undergoes 10
4 generations
per year (corresponding to a doubling time of 53 min) and
that microbial populations of constant size have been
proliferating at the same rate for the past 4 10
9 years, an
upper-bound of 10
45 genomes can be estimated to have
been generated since the origin of cellular genomes on
earth. Considering further that about one genome in a
hundred differs by mutation (Drake et al. 1998) and that a
self-sustaining cell’s genome contains a minimum of one
million bases, genotypes varying by at most 4–5 concom-
itant mutations are exhaustively screened all over the
biosphere. Even if we account in our crude calculation for
the contribution of conjugative plasmids and viral genomes
(Ochman et al. 2000; Bubanovic et al. 2005) as well as
transient hypermutator regimes (Ninio 1991), the conclu-
sion cannot be avoided that evolution has so far explored
only an extremely narrow sample of possible genotypes,
recorded as combinations of A, C, G and T (U), and of
phenotypes, recorded as metabolic routes, including DNA,
RNA and protein synthesis.
The fact that extant biodiversity lacks some functional
molecular device of atypical design in no way implies that
this device has been already evaluated and rejected during
evolution, but rather suggests that it was missed and
remained inaccessible throughout natural history.
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In vitro selection of novel genetic sequences encoding
RNA or proteins from random synthetic pools (Keefe and
Szostak 2001) can be expected to provide completely
unprecedented molecular lineages (Luisi et al. 2006), from
which unprecedented functions could in principle be
recruited in vivo. This feat, not yet accomplished, is a very
promising source of artiﬁcial biodiversity to upgrade nat-
ural species. It would amount to applying at the most basic
level the scenario of exaptation, i.e., ‘‘a feature that per-
forms a function but that was not produced by natural
selection for its current use’’ (Gould and Vrba 1982). Ex-
aptation in man-remodeled living organisms can be anti-
cipated to bring radical innovation if it is conducted in
population enclaves, in other words if evolutionary inter-
mediates are protected from predation by and competition
with natural species in long-term cultures of clonal popu-
lations or ecosystems assembled from cooperating clones
(Marliere et al. 2003).
It is a central tenet of Darwinian evolution that survival
of the ﬁttest leads to extinction of any variant bearing a
trait that lowers survival or reproduction rate to the
slightest extent relative to competitors lacking this trait,
even if such a counter-selected trait would provide an
overwhelming selective advantage at a further stage of
functional elaboration. Natural selection should therefore
be seen as routinely eliminating innovative features which
would supersede current forms of life, if only these features
would emerge as optimally crafted from scratch. To any
educated computer scientist, the Origin of Species (Darwin
1859) just reads like a mechanistically sophisticated and
brilliantly ornate description of a greedy algorithm, i.e., a
procedure that iteratively optimizes a combinatorial con-
ﬁguration by choosing at the next step the variants of the
prior conﬁguration with equal or higher merit. Greedy
algorithms are well known for bringing poor optimization
solutions to most combinatorial problems (Bang-Jensen
et al. 2004), which leads to the vexing notion that the whole
process of spontaneous biological creation and evolution
gave rise to the adoption of imperfect molecular devices
and processes.
Would any expert thus take the risk of asserting that a
common cell cannot be evolutionarily upgraded, say in a
matter of one to ten thousand generations after insertion of
properly designed synthetic genes (Jiang et al. 2008), so as
to outcompete the wild species from which it originated ? If
such could indeed be the case, should widespread marine
bacteria such as species of the genus Pelagibacter or
Prochlorococcus, which respectively release and ﬁx most
of the oceanic CO2, be excluded by synthetic biologists
from experimental upgrading tests for preventing global
climatic changes?
On the other hand, foundling genes originating from
random sequence pools could possibly be mobilized to
evolve awkward enzymes and replace efﬁcient metabolic
pathways with costly reaction itineraries, so as to down-
grade their cellular hosts and make them inherently unable
to outcompete their wild progenitors, i.e., built-in evolu-
tionary losers in the struggle for life. The word ‘‘Versch-
limmbesserung,’’ which is used in German for mocking
improvements that actually lower technical efﬁciency,
could perhaps be used for designating the branch of syn-
thetic biology aiming to protect natural ecosystems from
artiﬁcial invaders through virtuous sabotage.
Combining the substitution of canonical cell compo-
nents with alien ingredients (Cohen and Cowie 1957), the
recruitment of novel genes with no biological ancestry
from random pools (Keefe and Szostak 2001) or from
molecular design (Jiang et al. 2008), and the long-term
evolution of vast cell populations in isolation (Marliere
et al. 2003) might now provide a potent methodology to
explore a new biological world. Genesis of a second nature
could turn out to be a rather cheap experimental process, at
least in the microbiological realm. Before us likely lies the
deployment of earth-bound exobiology, in other words the
embodiment of virtual life forms and biological processes
of metabolism and coding that did not occur or could not
have evolved spontaneously through natural selection
alone.
Let us now turn to the opportunities that such an
exploratory endeavor provides to protect human health and
preserve natural environments.
The farther, the safer
The word ‘‘cabotage’’ was coined by Spanish seamen to
describe the safe navigation from cape to cape, in contrast
to perilously sailing away toward open seas. Metaphori-
cally, it is by restricting itself to exploring the vicinity of
the known continent of life and staying near the shores and
capes, the latter perhaps represented by extremophilic
organisms, that biotechnology keeps steering evolutionary
trajectories that do not depart from known forms of life.
But the crux of the matter is that, as compared with the risk
for navigation at sea, the risk for directed evolution of
synthetic species is precisely the opposite, namely, the
farther is now the safer. Indeed, the prospect of crafting and
evolving the most deviant life forms as the safest way of
establishing reliable and sustainable sources of chemicals,
energy, not to mention nutrients, horresco referens, is only
an apparent paradox.
The expert community and the lay public are still far
from being convinced, but for opposite reasons. The
experts of naturalist faith hold that current knowledge
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forms of life because they worship natural biodiversity
which they endow with the potency to have already
screened all conceivable chemical constitutions and
selected the optimal forms of life (Dryden et al. 2008).
Certainly, this hypothesis will not survive confrontation
with physical laws and computational principles. The lay
public, following a consistent philosophical tradition
(Heidegger 2000) and immemorial cosmological myths
(Miller 1985), holds that human artifacts, including GMOs
as their most transgressive avatars, have the inherent and
fatal character of destroying natural harmony. The histor-
ical record of industrial and agricultural misdeeds gives
credence to this hypothesis, although numerous innova-
tions that have lessened the environmental impact of global
practices while concomitantly improving industrial yields
are grossly overlooked (Collins 2001).
A compromise measure reached by the lay and expert
opinions has thus been to adopt the principle of physical
containment for exploring artiﬁcial biodiversity and con-
duct reprogramming of genomes by gene transfer. So far,
only the conﬁnement of genetically reprogrammed plants
has been discussed during the debates and is now legally
enforced by some nations (Sparrow 2009). The experts see
this measure as a futile tribute to superstition, while the
public distrusts it as a mere decoy insufﬁcient for averting
genetic disaster and equivalent to the barriers erected for
conﬁning nuclear pollution, which were proven faulty at
Chernobyl. Since the release of a single self-reproducing
entity must be rendered impossible, there is no alternative
to implementing fail-safe and leak-proof compartments
that will passively block evasion of every individual cell or
virus, including cases of negligent or malevolent human
behavior. Nevertheless, no scientiﬁc group involved in
synthetic biology is currently promoting the construction of
heavy-duty facilities for conﬁning synthetic organisms, as
was done for the handling of highly infectious and deadly
pathogens for medical research and presumably for the
secret elaboration of biological weapons.
What makes infectious pathogens so dangerous to us,
their prey and hosts, is their propensity to exploit us as a
source of nutrients and energy, and hence ultimately our
common chemical constitution with them. What renders us
so vulnerable to insidious agents such as AIDS retroviruses
and mad-cow prions, which can cross species boundaries
and infect our cells, is our intimate sharing of the same
coding system for nucleic acid and protein biosynthesis.
What wild wolves have to fear from humans is no longer
hunting and physical extermination, but out-breeding and
genetic pollution by the reservoir of dog alleles which
accumulated throughout domestication (e.g., drooping
ears), thus exemplifying yet another modality of artiﬁcial
molecular proximity as a threat to natural integrity (Butler
1994). Therefore, the surest if not simplest way to avoid
risks of dissemination and contamination by potentially
harmful synthetic species will be to evolve chemical con-
stitutions as deviant as possible from that of natural spe-
cies, and to rely on the persistence of these constitutions as
a built-in measure for counteracting the colonization of
wild habitats, including the human body.
Two categories of built-in safety appear tractable, tro-
phic containment, for preventing metabolic cross-feed, and
semantic containment, for preventing genetic cross-talk.
The two categories can be combined and implemented
redundantly in a single synthetic species.
Trophic containment
Trophic containment consists of making the proliferation
of a species dependent sine qua non upon the exogenous
supply of an alien molecule that does not occur in food
chains of natural habitats in the broadest sense, not as a
geochemical ingredient, nor as a regular chemical com-
ponent of cells nor as a by- or side-product of regular
metabolites. Trophic containment features the advantage of
a stoichiometric requirement: a population of the synthetic
species requiring a xeno-nutrient will reach a size propor-
tional to the quantity of that alien compound made avail-
able to it. Sufﬁcient sophistication will have to be
introduced in this scheme so that the requirement for the
xeno-nutrient cannot be circumvented by the synthetic
organism through utilization of a surrogate molecule
present in food chains, nor through spontaneous discovery
of a biosynthetic pathway for the xeno-nutrient by evolving
enzymes and metabolic pathways.
The evolution of metabolic processes in wild species for
degrading the xeno-nutrient and using it as source of ele-
ments and energy poses no problem. It could even be
considered as an advantage since biodegradation by wild
species will lower the amount of available xeno-nutrient
and therefore the population size of synthetic species
dependent upon its exogenous supply. The scientiﬁc liter-
ature bears mention of a ‘‘microbial infallibility hypothe-
sis,’’ according to which some micro-organism will be
found to degrade every molecule that is made by any living
organism (Gale 1952). Few organic molecules seem to
accumulate in natural habitats, which implies that almost
all of them must therefore be somehow recycled, even the
crosslinked polymers of lignin, which concentrate in the
humus of forest ground to be eventually volatilized by
heterotrophs such as fungi. The biodegradability of syn-
thetic molecules such as pesticides and herbicides, poly-
mers such as nylon, and even artiﬁcial antibiotics, lends
further credence to this hypothesis: after a latency in the
order of a decade or two, microbial species able to use
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degradative capability spreads by ‘‘interspeciﬁc horizontal
transfer.’’ Note that the progressive acquisition of degra-
dative reactions for converting a xeno-nutrient into com-
mon cellular chemicals (metabolites) by natural microbes
does not imply that synthetic reactions for producing this
xeno-nutrient could be progressively acquired by the
reprogrammed species or by natural species adapting to
undergo nutritional or genetic exchanges with artiﬁcial
species. Indeed, reactions with water and with oxygen are
used by scavenger micro-organisms to dismember organic
molecules but not for assembling them, because these
degradative reactions are totally irreversible.
By introducing chemical motifs that are very rare among
natural biomolecules (e.g., ether bridges, polycyclic ali-
phatic groups) or involving elements absent from natural
biomatter and highly improbable in aqueous environments
(e.g., silicon-carbon bonds), xeno-nutrients could be
designed so as to impede their biosynthetic access. In
addition, dependency on several xeno-nutrients inaccessi-
ble from existing metabolism and food chains could be
combined to saturate the search through natural selection
for producing these compounds autonomously in synthetic
species.
The three types of xeno-nutrients that seem more suit-
able for addicting synthetic species would be amino acids
(the building blocks of proteins), nucleotides (the building
blocks of nucleic acids) and coenzymes (vitamins, the
sophisticated chemical catalysts of certain metabolic
reactions). Lipids (the constituents of membranes) and
sugars (the building blocks of cell surfaces and cell walls),
whose structures vary much throughout species and even
under different growth conditions for a given species,
appear less strategic for diversifying the chemical arsenal
of life. Methods are available for mobilizing additional
amino acids in proteins of reprogrammed bacteria (Lem-
eignan et al. 1993; Mehl et al. 2003). It remains to be
proven, however, that such constructs with an augmented
genetic code can be stably bred in the long run.
Synthetic coenzymes that would not replace, as does
oxabiotin for biotin (Pilgrim et al. 1945), but add a cata-
lytic capability for performing metabolic reactions absent
from natural cells, hence enabling colonization of certain
industrial habitats, represent a tantalizing option for
enforcing trophic containment. Elaboration of such xeno-
vitamins should become a ﬂourishing branch of synthetic
biology.
Xeno-nucleic acids
Though more difﬁcult to tackle, the addiction of synthetic
organisms to additional nucleotides deserves a special
interest because it would open a path toward a radically
novel class of GMOs rendered safe through semantic as
well as trophic containment (Herdewijn and Marliere
2009).
Each class of the natural nucleic acids, DNA and RNA,
convey genetic information under the form of speciﬁc
successions of nucleobases chosen among four types
forming two pairs A:T and G:C (in RNA, T is slightly
altered into U). Each base A, C, G and T (U) is attached to
a backbone motif, of which there are two types, ribose in
RNA and deoxyribose in DNA. Synthetic alternatives of
both nucleobases and backbone motifs have been demon-
strated to lead to well-behaved unnatural nucleic acids
when incorporated into polymers (Sismour and Benner
2005). For the sake of clarity, it is worth dwelling on the
potential biological consequences of the usage of these two
broad classes of unnatural nucleic acid building-blocks.
Nucleotides bearing additional bases, say V and W, on a
canonical DNA or RNA backbone and able to form pairs
V:W compatible with A:T and G:C could in principle
progressively invade existing DNA and RNA molecules
and provide a larger lexicon of sequence combinations,
e.g., VWV or CWA, that natural species would be unable
to propagate. The technological sophistication needed for
equipping the genetic expression system of a synthetic
organism with an additional pair of complementary bases
(V and W) would amount to supplying four metabolites
(dVTP, dWTP, rVTP, rWTP) and at least two catalytic
macromolecules (one altered tRNA and one altered
mRNA) in order to become operational in conveying
genetic information into proteins (Bain et al. 1992). At
least three additional and reliable base-pair systems have
been validated in vitro and await launching in vivo (Sis-
mour and Benner 2005; Yang et al. 2007; Kimoto et al.
2008).
A different scheme features additional nucleotides
bearing canonical bases onto a chemically deviant back-
bone in lieu of ribose and deoxyribose (Pochet et al. 2003).
The polymerization of such deviant building blocks would
not result into the invasion of existing DNA or RNA
polymers, but into the generation of a distinct type of
informational biopolymer, XNA (xeno-nucleic acid). XNA
would be propagated as a chemically estranged form of
plasmid, that should not interfere with DNA or RNA bio-
synthesis or function (Herdewijn and Marliere 2009).
The technological sophistication needed for implementing
this scheme would amount to supplying at least one addi-
tional pair of metabolites (e.g., xATP and xUTP) and two
specialized polymerization enzymes (an XNA-dependent
XNA polymerase and an XNA-dependent RNA polymer-
ase). The polymerization of three deviant backbones is
currently being pursued in vitro (Kempeneers et al. 2005;
Tsai et al. 2007; Schmidt 2009), and a consortium,
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the aim to launch an XNA bridgehead in vivo (http://www.
synbiosafe.eu/index=php?page=orthosome).
Safe vector-host systems and prevention of carry-over
contamination in PCR are commonly implemented using
natural molecular mechanisms (Glenting and Wessels
2005) such as toxin/antitoxin neutralization (Stieber et al.
2008) and repair by uracil-N-glycosylase (Longo et al.
1990). Their high efﬁciency of built-in inactivation can be
considered as satisfactory in the laboratory, yet they all
give rise to rare escape events and thus fall short of the
criterion of infallibility required for protecting human
health and wild habitats. It is this absolute criterion of
dependency on the supply of xeno-nutrients that propaga-
tion of XNA-supported information will have to pass for
qualifying as a safe GMO technology.
Semantic containment
In principle, semantic containment could be enforced
without requiring any additional or alternative building-
block, by reassigning codons between canonical amino
acids. There exist 64 different triplets of the four canonical
bases A, C, G, U, serving as codons for the 20 canonical
amino acids and punctuation signals in protein synthesis on
the ribosome. Highly discriminating enzymes (synthetases)
attach a given amino acid to a cognate RNA adaptor
(tRNA) to generate the aminoacyl-tRNAs (aa-tRNA) that
are condensed into proteins (amino acid polymers) in
response to codon signals on messenger RNA (mRNA),
thus freeing tRNAs again to enter another condensation
cycle. The overall process, called genetic translation,
which involves several hundred RNA and protein mole-
cules and stands as the most sophisticated function evolved
by life, originated nearly 4 billion years ago and has
remained nearly invariant since (Ambrogelly et al. 2007).
Few extant species deviate in the assignment of triplet
nucleotide codons to amino acids, an empirical observation
that was dogmatized as the Universal Genetic Code. It has
been argued that this (nearly) universal conservation was
not dictated by physical and chemical constraints, but
adopted as an indirect consequence of interspeciﬁc genetic
transfers (Syvanen 1985). Any species deviating from the
genetic ‘‘lingua franca’’ spoken by other species would
indeed ﬁnd itself cut off from the rest of the living world
and could not beneﬁt from the know-how elaborated
abroad (Ambrogelly et al. 2007).
Creating genetic enclaves by actively enforcing codon
reassignments in cell lineages thus appears as a straight-
forward scenario for progressively alienating synthetic
organisms and building a Tower of Babel of genetic codes.
Whole rewriting of bacterial genomes could be used for
this purpose, but alternative methods based on long-term
cultivation in isolation of missense strains have also
undergone a proof a concept (Do ¨ring and Marlie `re 1998).
A missense strain is a population of microbial cells in
which non-cognate chemical linkages between an amino
acid and a tRNA occurs (non-canonical aa-tRNA) through
the mobilization of mutant tRNA or mutant synthetase.
Certain wild bacterial species with deviant DNA compo-
sition, such as A?T rich Mycoplasma and G?C rich
Micrococcus no longer use certain codons, which are thus
available for reassignment to canonical or synthetic amino
acids. Such ‘‘compositional extremophiles’’ offer a pre-
cious starting point with a vast potential for reprogramming
and breeding synthetic organisms unable to interpret the
genes from natural species or the genes from other sepa-
rately estranged lineages.
In principle, this approach of genetic estrangement
through codon reassignment can be freely combined with
the nutritional enforcement of additional building blocks,
amino acids, coenzymes and nucleotides, as described
above. Since estranging the genetic code and enforcing
alien nutrients can in turn each be multiplied in a given
cell, a workable approach should attempt to simultaneously
and stably prevent cross-talk and cross-feed between arti-
ﬁcial and natural biodiversities. Such a scenario of redun-
dant semantic and trophic containment (RST), which
remains to be validated operationally, provides a concep-
tual basis for establishing a constructive debate with
environmentalists about the preservation of natural
habitats.
Humble programmers and modest creators
Aside from the numerous pioneering demonstrations that
augur most favorably for the advances to come, many of
the prophecies recently uttered in the budding ﬁeld of
synthetic biology are pervaded by wishful thinking (Pol-
lack 2006). The risk to overthrow the formal criterions of
scientiﬁc discourse is of particular concern in North
America, where the souls of the synthetic biology com-
munity at times seem to be possessed by the demon of
hype. Indeed, claiming that the capability to chemically
synthesize entire microbial genomes, and soon after entire
cells, is about to solve the global energetic equation by
enabling the metabolic supply of an inexhaustible amount
of hydrogen from sunlight and seawater, borders on sha-
manic delusion (Shand et al. 2007). This sounds like
claiming that the capability to assemble a pipe organ also
endows the organ builder with the gift of composing toc-
catas and fugues by sheer improvisation. Of course, such
utterances do not diminish in the least the potential of
reprogramming cells with whole synthetic genomes for
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promises, an explicit programming of phenotypes by
rewriting genotypes will need to be conducted, the prin-
ciples of which still remain in limbo.
Also inﬂated with wishful thinking seems to be the
claimed potency of standard biomolecular bricks, chassis,
foundries, registries and the like, for paralleling in bio-
technology the design and production of industrial artifacts
such as the integrated circuits of electronics (Shand et al.
2007). Alas, self-reproduction and evolvability are not just
features that can be added to the list of other technical
speciﬁcations, because they constitute an undeﬁned
dynamic challenge that precisely forbids the application of
the methods of design and implementation that engineers
have practiced so far. A suggestive metaphor pictures
evolution as modifying the wings and reactors of an air-
plane in-ﬂight. Methods for abstracting such unprecedented
technological requirements are still cruelly lacking. It
should be recalled in this respect that the founding fathers
of informatics found it wise early on to proscribe self-
modifying programs altogether.
Clearly, the simple-minded modular formats of hier-
archical design which are currently heralded to make
synthetic biology comply with the imperatives of engi-
neering (Endy 2005) will be insufﬁcient to change the
chemical constitution of synthetic organisms as sketched
above. No college of living experts or convention of
expert systems will for some time predict the correct text
to write in synthetic genomes in order to make, for
example, informational biopolymers and metabolism
accrued by incorporating the element silicon or devoid of
the element phosphorus (Westheimer 1987), though such
constructs should presumably be viable if not accessible
from extant forms of life. It is in tackling the most
arduous compositional problems, by adding, substituting
or removing types of molecular components or chemical
elements in living organisms (Walter et al. 2005) that we
shall learn the methods needed by the ‘‘modest creator’’
to provide safe solutions that pass the innocuousness test
in ecosystems just as the ‘‘humble programmer’’ has to
learn methods to pass the optimality test of algorithms in
computers (Dijkstra 1972). In so doing, synthetic biology
will follow the precepts that were put forward by Edsger
Dijkstra, arch-formalist of computation and founder of
hierarchical design and levels of abstraction, which are
precisely invoked for empowering synthetic biology
(Endy 2005).
Less predisposed to succumb to hype, the European
community of synthetic biologists nevertheless suffers
from its own frailties, institutional conformism and pusil-
lanimity. Europeans should always remember that they are
the descendants of those who did not leave to conquer the
New World. It has been argued that instead, they embarked
on an inner journey where they found the abstraction of
mechanisms and scientiﬁc laws (Sloterdijk 2001). Ameri-
cans meanwhile resorted to technical pragmatism for
accommodating a pristine continent. As an endeavor
requiring both abstraction and pragmatism, synthetic bio-
logy offers a conciliatory forum for ‘‘modest creators’’
from all cultures to shape the science of living systems, to
forge the technology of safe and ever more varied forms of
life and to seal the pact of ethical accountability that
societies and their governments ask for, in exchange for the
freedom to breed a second nature.
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